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DO FIRMS DOWNSIZE TO 
PLEASE INVESTORS? 
Investor responses to downsizing activities depend on different fac-
tors. Firm performance, industry waves and the macroeconomic 
outlook play an important role.
Workforce downsizing, defined as the intentional reduction 
in workforce to improve firm performance, is a frequently 
used practice by managers. It is a widespread answer to in-
dustry downturns and wider economic crises, with the aim to 
achieve improved future competitiveness and performance. 
A popular belief that is frequently propagated in public me-
dia is that companies undertake downsizings to please finan-
cial investors. In line with prior academic studies in the field 
of strategic human resource management and organization-
al restructuring, the empirical study by Matthias Brauer, Pro-
fessor of Strategic and International Management, on inves-
tor response to firm downsizing challenges this widely-held 
belief. Drawing on behavioral theory, Professor Brauer and 
Martin Zimmermann argue and find that investors are much 
more likely to respond negatively to workforce downsizing 
announcements. Moreover, their large scale empirical study 
extends prior academic work on the performance implica-
tions of workforce downsizing by specifying the contingen-
cies under which workforce downsizing is viewed more or 
less favorably by investors. This contingency approach takes 
into account that investors are boundedly rational and their 
evaluations of downsizings are affected by various cognitive 
biases. Importantly, these cognitive biases are argued and 
found to be more or less prominent depending on when and 
under what conditions the decision to downsize is taken.
Investor decision-making is partially biased
In particular, the researchers specify four influencing fac-
tors which they consider relevant for investors’ perception 
of downsizings. As a starting point, they hypothesize that 
greater downsizing magnitude is in fact associated with a 
particularly negative investor response because large scale 
downsizings entail a severe disruption of a firm’s organiza-
tional routines and structures. Large scale downsizings are 
also likely to cause severe survivor effects, which include 
losses in overall productivity because of lower motivation 
and commitment among remaining employees (“survivors”) 
in post-downsizing periods. Moreover, the pronounced neg-
ative investor response is argued to stem from increased 
uncertainty with regard to the future viability of the firm 
following large scale downsizings. Subsequently, the two 
scholars examine under which conditions investors might 
perceive downsizings of different magnitude either more 
or less favorably. In contrast to prior research studies, they 
not only explore firm-level contingencies but also examine 
how industry-level and macro-level factors shape investor 
response to workforce downsizing. Building on insights from 
behavioral theory, they propose that investors react partic-
ularly negative to downsizing announcements in times of 
industry downsizing waves and in times of deteriorating 
macro-economic outlooks. In short, they suggest that the 
amplified negative investor response is due to a so called 
pessimism-bias among investors which means that negative 
information weighs especially strongly in investor judge-
ments. Moreover, the amplified negative investor response 
under these conditions is argued to stem from the fact that 
investors are likely to perceive the downsizing as “herding 
behavior” on part of the firm. Firms which downsize when all 
their other industry peers downsize are penalized by inves-
tors because these firms seem to act less strategically and 
independently in the eyes of investors. Finally, the authors 
argue and find that investor response to workforce down-
sizing is even more negative when executives are found to 
have been poorly responsive to the need to restructure. Spe-
cifically, their empirical findings suggest that downsizings 
which occur after the financial performance of the firm has 
deteriorated over multiple years are received particularly 
negatively by investors. 
Understanding factors that condition investor response
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Professor Brauer holds the Chair of Strategic and Internation-
al Management at the University of Mannheim. His prima-
ry area of expertise is Strategic Business Development and 
transformation. Recent papers on these research topics have 
been published in leading academic journals including the 
Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management 
Journal, Journal of Management Studies, or Journal of Man-
agement. As part of the core faculty of the Mannheim Busi-
ness School (MBS), he actively serves as an instructor and 
coach for companies in the automotive, energy, financial 
services, healthcare, software, transportation and utilities 
industries.
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Workforce downsizings should be conducted with 
great care
What major insights can managers draw from Brauer and 
Zimmermann’s empirical study that is based on a sample 
of roughly 700 downsizings by US Fortune 500 companies 
during the time period of 2001-2012? Most importantly, the 
study reminds executives that downsizings bear substantial 
risks for a firm’s short-term market valuation. Consequently, 
workforce downsizing should be considered as a restructur-
ing action of last rather than first resort. For those cases in 
which alternative restructuring measures do not seem via-
ble, the study advises managers to carefully consider the ex-
tent of the downsizing as well as the timing of the decision 
to downsize. Especially large scale downsizings are heavily 
penalized by investors and the study’s results indicate that 
for large scale downsizings, investors are greatly sensitive 
about the timing. In particular, the study suggests that 
downsizings should be undertaken before a company gets 
into a financial downward spiral. Moreover, the empirical 
findings suggest that executives should not blindly follow 
the restructuring behavior of industry peers but act proac-
tively and countercyclically. 
Brauer, M., Zimmermann, M. (2017). Investor response to work-
force downsizing: the influence of industry waves, macroeco-
nomic outlook, and firm performance. Journal of Management: 
JOM. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206317734901. Print version 
forthcoming.
DOES PLATFORM OWNER‘S ENTRY  
CROWD OUT INNOVATION? 
Platform firms have attracted much public attention for competing 
actively with associated firms in ecosystems. But does competing 
with complementors really hurt innovation? Latest insights indi-
cate that such competition can actually enhance innovation.
How innovation ecosystems work
Producing and selling goods used to be clear and easy. Firms 
invented a product, built and sold it independently of their 
competitors. Companies executed value-adding processes 
internally and competitors were kept away from the core 
functions of a firm’s value chain which resembled a pipeline. 
Starting in the domain of information technologies, a shift 
away from orchestrating pipelines occurred, as some com-
panies initiated a platform strategy to gain momentum. 
Tech firms redefined the division of labor with partnering 
firms to foster complementary innovation. In simple terms: 
they deployed hard and software ecosystems on the basis 
of open standards which provided incentives for partnering 
firms to develop yet embedded but complementary prod-
ucts and services. A popular example is the mobile operating 
system Android for which a myriad of devices, applications 
(“apps”), and gadgets have been provided by autonomous 
third party vendors. Without these innovative complements, 
the Android system would be far less powerful. Google, the 
developer and owner of Android, benefits from this layered 
but integrated product pool, increases the attractiveness 
and value of its software ecosystem, and attracts new com-
plementors. Thus, its role changed from managing a pipeline 
towards orchestrating a platform as a guarantor for innova-
tion and progress.
Competing with complementors
Although the success of platform firms depends on the ca-
pabilities of its complementors, they sometimes have to 
spur their complementors by competing with them on their 
own platform. Google, Apple, and Microsoft frequently enter 
niches of their complementors with own products and ser-
vices, thereby seriously challenging their partners’ business-
es. As platform operators are often significantly larger and 
more powerful than complementors, this crowding-out be-
havior has attracted much public attention in the past, from 
Microsoft’s Antitrust Trials in the early 1990s to the current 
investigations of the European Commission against Google. 
However, the impact of platform owners’ competition with 
complementors has remained largely unexplored. Armin 
Heinzl, Professor of General Management and Information 
Systems, has been working on this topic. Together with his 
Mannheim scholar Jens Foerderer, his former scholar Thom-
as Kude, now ESSEC Business School, and his colleague Sunil 
Mithas, University of Maryland, he has explored the phenom-
enon for three years (2015-2018). With the study “Does Plat-
form Owner’s Entry Crowd Out Innovation? Evidence from 
Google Photos”, the authors examined the consequences of 
a platform owner’s actions in a unique setting provided by 
Google’s entry into the niche market for photography apps 
within its own Android platform in 2015. They studied Goo-
gle entering the ecosystem niche with an own app in order 
to investigate whether such entries hurt complementors’ 
innovation activities or whether it provides innovation en-
hancing effects. Ph
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Managerial choices in governing a platform ecosystem
Armin Heinzl is Professor and Chair in General Management 
and Information Systems at the University of Mannheim. 
His research and teaching interests are IT management, IT 
enabled work processes, and digital platform ecosystems. 
He received his Masters’ degree in Business Administration 
at the University of Frankfurt in 1986, his doctoral degree 
in 1990, and his habilitation in 1995 in Information Systems 
at the Koblenz School of Corporate Management (WHU 
Koblenz). Heinzl was holding visiting positions at Harvard, 
Berkeley, Irvine, ESSEC Paris, and London School of Econom-
ics. He was a founding co-director of the Mannheim Business 
School. He currently acts as the academic director of the Dig-
ital Academy, the head of the supervisory board of Ameria 
AG, member of the executive board of Baden-Wuerttemberg 
Connected e.V. (bwcon) as well as the Treasury Intelligence 
GmbH, Walldorf. Furthermore, he serves as a Vice Editor in 
Chief of the academic journal Business Information Systems 
Engineering (BISE).
Based on a profound analysis of download numbers and app 
releases in Google’s app market Playstore, the findings sug-
gest that at least this entry was followed by an increase in in-
novation: complementors were more likely to incrementally 
innovate their photography apps and release new app ver-
sions in the affected market niche. The researchers have esti-
mated that the entry caused an increase in the likelihood of 
major app updates by 9.6% for apps affected by Google’s en-
try, as compared to control groups where no crowding-out 
behavior took place.
Launching a rival product: spurring innovation in 
ecosystem niches
The increase in innovation is related to a surge in consum-
er attention and demand for photography apps caused by 
Google’s market entry, thereby creating new and strong in-
centives for complementors to innovate. The effect is even 
more pronounced for larger and diversified complementors 
who are in a position to leverage the increase in consumer 
attention and demand. In other words, the study reveals that 
competing with complementors does not always hurt inno-
vation, at least in the short-run. On the contrary, platform 
owners can stimulate innovation by entering the platform 
ecosystem with own products. The increase in complemen-
tary innovation is likely to result from an attention spillover 
that particularly benefits resourceful complementors. These 
actors may even perceive a platform owner’s entry as an op-
portunity rather than a threat, and they may direct their ef-
forts toward that particular market segment in order to profit 
from the “growing pie” created by the attention spillover. 
The study’s findings provide valuable insights regarding 
the innovation consequences of managerial choices in 
governing a platform ecosystem. Software firms, software 
developers, app developers and entrepreneurs can benefit 
from the recommendations of the study. Furthermore, the 
findings are important for policymakers who work on anti-
trust policies and regulations of dominant digital platform 
ecosystems. They should fully understand the impact of the 
regulatory actions.
Foerderer, J., Kude, T., Mithas, S., Heinzl, A. (2018): Does Platform 
Owner’s Entry Crowd Out Innovation? Evidence from Google 
Photos. Information Systems Research, 29(2): 444-460.
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RISK-SHARING  
BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 
Firms can protect their employees against layoffs during adverse 
industry shocks. In return, employees receive lower wages. Such 
implicit contracts work out – as long as employees have enough 
political clout.
Board-level employee representation has re-entered the po-
litical agenda. Even countries that have traditionally been 
skeptical about giving employees better representation 
and more say in corporate decision-making now discuss 
board-level employee representation. Prime minister May 
suggested changes in this direction in the UK in 2017, and 
Senator Warren has introduced a legislative proposal to the 
same end in the US in 2018. While the political debate con-
tinues to be heated and controversial, rigorous academic 
evidence is scant.
In a recent empirical study, Ernst Maug, Professor for Cor-
porate Finance, together with his co-authors E. Han Kim 
(University of Michigan) and Christoph Schneider (Tilburg 
University), analyze board-level employee representation in 
Germany and argue that labor participation in the compa-
ny’s management facilitates risk sharing between employers 
and employees.
Human capital arguably represents the largest source of risk 
in the world of work. During economic recessions, employ-
ers might be forced to downsize their workforce in order to 
maintain their current position in the market. Thus, losing 
their job as a consequence of economic stress is a wide-
spread fear among employees. Economic theorists have long 
argued that optimal risk sharing would involve an implicit 
contract, an arrangement in which employees receive em-
ployment protection in exchange for lower wages, which 
they would accept as an insurance premium. However, it is 
unclear how firms could commit to such an arrangement, 
in which they uphold employment even during economic 
downturns. In addition, workers must be willing to com-
pensate firms for the job guarantees they receive from their 
companies. Ernst Maug and his co-authors argue that code-
termination is such an institution that allows firms to make 
credible commitments, which workers are willing to honor 
through lower compensation as a quid pro quo.
Codetermination enforces the implicit contract
The authors use plant-level data from Germany, which is 
ideally suited for such an analysis. The country was at the 
forefront of labor representation starting in the 1970s and is 
about average in terms of employment protection rights in 
the OECD. Since 1976, so called parity-codetermination has 
been in place. This means that 50 percent employee repre-
sentation on supervisory boards is required by law, for firms 
that have a workforce of 2,000 employees or more.
The analysis covers data for the years 1990 to 2008. The study 
investigates whether employment and wage insurance is 
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The impact of labor representation
Ernst Maug has been professor for Corporate Finance at the 
University of Mannheim, Business School since February 
2006. He served the School as Associate Dean for Research 
and director of the Business School’s doctoral programs. In 
2018, he is president of the European Finance Association. 
Before coming to Mannheim, he taught at the Department 
of Business and Economics at Humboldt, the Fuqua School of 
Business (Duke University), and the London Business School. 
Professor Maug was visiting professor at the University of 
New South Wales, Duke University, and the London School 
of Economics, from where he obtained his Ph.D. in 1993.
Professor Maug’s main research interest is in Corporate Fi-
nance with a particular emphasis on Corporate Governance. 
Recent work focuses on the interface between fi nancial mar-
kets and labor markets. His prior research analyzes executive 
compensation contracts, the role of blockholders, corporate 
boards, and shareholder voting. His research was published 
in the American Economic Review, the Journal of Finance, 
the Journal of Financial Economics, the Review of Financial 
Studies, and other journals, and has won several prizes.
provided and if so, whether it has an infl uence on the fi rm’s 
performance. The study’s results indicate that in case of par-
ity-codetermination, two groups of employees are indeed 
successfully protected: white-collar and skilled blue-collar 
workers benefi t from the arrangement. These workers profi t 
from an employment protection that employees in non-par-
ity companies do not receive. For unskilled blue-collar work-
ers however, not even parity-codetermination does the trick. 
The authors attribute the unfortunate position of this group 
to the fact that it is never represented on supervisory boards. 
Unskilled blue-collar workers, about 20 percent of the work 
force, particpate in the elections of board representatives, 
but their interests do not appear to be represented suﬃ  -
ciently well, so as to enforce implicit contracts, which em-
phasizes the importance of participation in governance.
Shareholders do not profi t, only skilled workers 
capture the gains 
The study reveals that employees with higher educational 
qualifi cations, a group that largely overlaps with white-collar 
and the skilled blue-collar workers, accept lower compensa-
tion of 3.3 percent when they work for a parity-codetermined 
fi rm. In exchange, the group benefi ts from employment in-
surance and the company can put the savings aside for a po-
tential recession phase. Inevitably, this fi nding leads to the 
question whether this is enough to overcome downturns. 
Do parity-codetermined companies survive periods of re-
cession? Do shareholders even profi t from the implicit insur-
ance model? Or does the employment insurance stemming 
from parity-codetermination put the fi rms in a bad fi nancial 
position in the long run?  
Ernst Maug and his co-authors fi nd that in fact, compared 
to non-parity fi rms, economic shocks hit parity fi rms par-
ticularly hard. But the savings from the wage concessions 
seem to compensate the loss. The study analyzes the com-
panies through the whole business cycle, including diff erent 
states of the economy, and fi nds no long-term diff erences in 
performance and valuation between parity and non-parity 
fi rms. However, this means that workers profi t from employ-
ment insurance, while shareholders are not rewarded with 
any gain. The authors draw the conclusion that, therefore, 
fi rms will not voluntarily install labor representation in their 
governance structure. Regulatory intervention might be 
needed when the employment insurance should be spread.
Kim, E H., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2018). Labor representa-
tion in governance as an insurance mechanism. Review of Fi-
nance, 22, 1251-1289.
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